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CYPRUS: THE REASONS BEHIND 1974 INTERVENTION

INTRODUCTION

Cyprus has a very strategic importance for the security of Eastern Mediterranean. And, Cyprus is an island which is only 40 miles away from Turkey. This location of the Cyprus makes it a vital area for the defence of Turkey. In this essay, I am going to mention the ENOSIS aim of Greek Cypriots which means the unity with Greece and therefore the underlying factors that effected the 1974 Turkish intervention to the island. So; as many Greeks mention it; the 1974 Intervention was not the cause of Cyprus problem, but the consequence of it.

I am not going to get into the details of any historical background of the Cyprus. But, I have to mention that Cyprus was a part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 to 1878. In 1878 the expansionist policy of Tsarist Russia caused the Ottomans to cede Cyprus to Britain which promised to help the Ottomans in the event of an attack by Russia on certain bordering provinces. Britain annexed the island when the Ottoman Empire joined forces with Germany and its allies in 1914. In 1925 Cyprus became a crown colony. After this date, the idea of ENOSIS started to take place among the Greek Cypriots. ENOSIS means “union” in Greek and reflects the desire of Greeks in Greece and the Greek Cypriots to annex the island to the “mainland” Greece.

From 1955 the Greek Cypriot EOKA organisation, under the leadership of George Grivas started to fight for ENOSIS; not independence. Makarios was the Archbishop of the island, but in the same time he also was a supporter of ENOSIS.

In 1960, Zurich and London Agreements were signed and The Cyprus Republic was established. The new state was a bi-communal Republic with a single territory and a unique Constitution which embodied on agreed political partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and which **prohibited the political or economic union of Cyprus with any other state.**

From 1963 on, Greek Cypriots started to attack the Turkish Cypriots under the lights of the 13 points of Makarios and the Akritas Plan. Severe inter-communal fighting occurred in 1963-64. In 1964, UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus) was established on the island. From 1967, Turkish Cypriots begun to govern themselves. But, in 1974, when Makarios was overthrown with the coup of Sampson backed by the Greek military junta in Athens, Greek Cypriots started again to massacre the Turkish Cypriots.

In this essay, I am planning to explain the underlying reasons of the Turkish intervention in 1974 to the island. I will give information on the idea of ENOSIS, the 1960 Agreements, the ignorance of these agreements with the 13 Points of Makarios and the Akritas Plan, and the activities of Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriots.

I. Was Cyprus A Historical Part of Greece?: When we look at the history, we will see that the Helens (the Greeks) have never ruled the island of Cyprus even in the period of Pericles which was the strongest period of Greeks. During the rule of Byzantine Empire it is obvious that Cyprus was directed from Antachia but not from any Greek city.

In a speech, Sir Winston Churchill quotes: “The people of Cyprus are not Greek. They are a mixtured nation of Greeks and the Egyptians who migrated there¹.” As Sir Dudley Stamp says; “the island has no relationship with Greece out of the language and the religion.”²

It is true that Cyprus has a connection with Greece by the facts of the existence of a Greek speaking community on the island and the common religious belief of both communities of being Orthodox. But, we must not forget that the overall acceptance of Greek and Orthodox Church by the people of the island was achieved after a strong resistance against the Byzantine Empire.

II. What is ENOSIS?: ENOSIS is synonymous with ANSCHLUSS (in Greek and German, both words carry the same meaning; “union”.) This word reflects the revival of old racist ambitions for territorial expansion. It means the union of the Cyprus with the “mainland” Greece. It is obvious that ENOSIS is a part of the Greek Megalo Idea (The Big Desire) which can be explained as “the rebirth of the Byzantine Empire”. It is a part of pan-hellenist policies. Pan-hellenism is an ideology based on the idea of “wherever there is a Helen, the borders of Greece is there.”

For the Greek Orthodox Church, ENOSIS means the “restoration of the Byzantine Empire”, which includes Cyprus.

For Greek Cypriot extremists and armed elements (EOKA etc.) ENOSIS means the long delayed opportunity to settle old scores with the Turks.

For Greek Cypriot rightists, ENOSIS means Freedom which they have for generations been indoctrinated by the Church and schools to believe to represent “the integration of Cyprus (the southern outpost of Hellenism) with the Greece (the national trunk).”³

¹ The Times, 17.12.1954.

² Stamp, Dudley. Asia. (A Regional and Economic Geography). 1957, London.

³ TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Why No Solution?. 1997; TRNC.

In 1879 the British began to allow Greeks to settle in Cyprus, and “patriotic committees” were set up in Greece to encourage the emigration of Greeks to Cyprus. During the British rule, Greece had sent school-teachers, lawyers, doctors and priests to Cyprus in order to foment nationalism amongst the Greek-speaking population and to annex the island to Greece. On 17th April 1895 the British Magistrate in Nicosia wrote that Greek school children had been organised to march through the Turkish quarter singing songs about “the slaughter of the hated Moslems.” During the period of Balkan Wars; the Greek population increased. And, during this period many Turkish Cypriot families were forced by poverty and by fear of a Greek take over to emigrate to Turkey. At the outbreak of war in 1914 many more left, and between then and 1939 about 8.000 Turkish Cypriots had settled in Turkey alone.

In 1931 there was an abortive uprising for union with Greece. As a result, the British suspended all popular representation in the administration of the colony and imposed strict restrictions on all nationalistic activities.

The leaders of 1931 insurrection returned to the island from exile in Greece after the WW II and resumed their militant activities for uniting the island with Greece.

1950 was a significant year and the Greek Orthodox Church organised a plebiscite for ENOSIS. In the same year, Archbishop Makarios III was enthroned as the new Archbishop of Cyprus. He declared on enthronement that he would devote all his energies to achieving ENOSIS during his lifetime.⁴

There is no doubt that ENOSIS, invested as it is with the most intense religious and nationalistic overtones, has been and probably still is, the principal obstacle to good relations between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, and even between Turkey and Greece.

III. EOKA Actions and The Terrorist Campaign: In 1954, Greece brought the Cyprus problem before the United Nations, seeking the union of Cyprus with Greece through the one-sided application of the principle of “self-determination”. The same year, Colonel George Grivas, a Greek national, landed in Cyprus with Greek arms and personnel in order to organise an underground movement for union with Greece. Grivas has been invited to Cyprus by Archbishop Makarios.⁵ All the resources of the church were put at that organisation’s disposal and it became active under the name of the EOKA.

EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston) stands for “National Organisation For The Cyprus Struggle”. EOKA’s ranks were closed to Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots were “the religious and national enemy” who opposed ENOSIS. In the bulletins of EOKA it was mentioned that the anticipated struggle with the Turkish Cypriots was to be delayed until the expulsion of the British from Cyprus, and in any case it was expected to be short and sharp.

On April 1, 1955 EOKA opened a campaign of violence against British rule in a well-coordinated series of attacks on police, military, and other government

⁴ Denktas, R.R. The Cyprus Triangle. London, 1982 p.20.

⁵ Memoirs of General Grivas. Longman, 1964. London p.20

installations. EOKA started killing everyone in its way under the pretext of struggling for independence, the British, the Turkish Cypriots and even some of their own kinsmen who for various reasons opposed to ENOSIS.

During a difficult summer of attacks and counterattacks, the Tripartite Conference of 1955 was convened in London in August at British invitation; representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments met with British authorities to discuss Cyprus. The meeting broke up in September, having accomplished nothing. The Greeks were dissatisfied because Cypriot self-determination (a code word for ENOSIS) was not offered; the Turks because it was not forbidden.

After the tripartite meeting, chief of the British imperial general staff, Field Marshal John Harding was named governor of Cyprus and arrived on the island to assume his post. In November Harding declared a state of emergency, banning public assemblies, introducing the death penalty for carrying a weapon, and making strikes illegal. In 1956, Harding exiled Makarios to the Seychelles because of his effect on EOKA terrorist activities. The level of violence on Cyprus increased, a general strike was called, and Grivas had political leadership thrust on him by the archbishop's absence.

In early 1958, Grivas tried to enforce an island-wide boycott of British goods and increased the level of sabotage attacks. In June 1958, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proposed a seven-year partnership scheme of separate communal legislative bodies and separate municipalities, which became known as Macmillan Plan. Greece and Greek Cypriots rejected it, calling it tantamount to partition.

During the EOKA revolt, from 1955 to 1958, the Turkish community was in a very vulnerable position. Throughout the island Turkish Cypriots became a target for EOKA terrorists. Hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were killed and wounded while 6.000 Turkish Cypriot refugees, whose homes and properties in thirty-three villages had been destroyed by EOKA, looked to the future with grave suspicion.

In 1959; Turkey, Greece and Britain agreed on a formula for settling the Cyprus problem. After full consultations with the leaders of all sides, the Zurich and London Agreements were drawn up.

IV. 1960 Agreements and 1960 Constitution: Although by then the Greek Cypriots were more numerous, the Turkish Cypriots had lived in Cyprus for more than 400 years as a distinct community; and in exercise of their right of self-determination they were willing to join in forming a new Republic embracing the whole of the island only if that basic fact of political life in Cyprus was formally recognised.

The negotiations in Zurich and London preceding independence were long and difficult, but it was eventually agreed by way of compromise between all five participants (Britain, Greece, Turkey, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) that the new state would be a bi-communal Republic with a single territory but a unique Constitution which embodied an agreed political partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and which prohibited the political or economic union of Cyprus with any other state.

In London and Zurich, three agreements were signed. They were the Treaty of Establishment which predicted the establishment of an independent Cyprus Republic out of two British bases; the Treaty of Guarantee which gave Turkey, Greece and the Britain the right to intervene in any case of threat towards the unity and independence of the Cyprus Republic; and the Treaty of Alliance among Turkey, Greece and the Cyprus Republic gave Greece and turkey the rights to station military forces on the island.

At independence, Cyprus's constitution called for a government divided into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, headed by a president, with strong guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot community. The constitution arranged for a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice president, elected by their respective communities for five-year terms of office. The two executives had the right of veto, separately or jointly, over certain laws or decisions of both the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives, the legislative body. The Council of Ministers was to be composed of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots. Decisions of the council were to be taken by absolute majority.

The unicameral House of Representatives was designed to legislate for the republic in all matters except those expressly reserved to separate communal chambers. The constitution provided that thirty-five of its members be Greek Cypriots and fifteen Turkish Cypriots. Voting in the House of Representatives was to be by majority, except that separate majorities in the two communities were required for imposition of taxes or duties, modification of the electoral law, or laws relating to the separate municipalities in the five main towns.

The constitution also called for the creation of two communal chambers, composed of representatives elected by each community. These chambers were empowered to deal with religious, educational, and cultural matters, questions of personal status, and the supervision of cooperatives and credit societies.

The judicial system broadly outlined in the Zurich- London accords and stipulated in detail in the constitution included the Supreme Constitutional Court, the High Court of justice, district and assize courts, and communal courts. Supreme Constitutional Court was composed of three judges: a Greek Cypriot, a Turkish Cypriot, and a contracted judge from a neutral country who would serve as president of the court.

The constitution set forth other safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots in sections dealing with the civil service and the armed forces of the republic. The constitution required that the two groups be represented in the civil service at a ratio of 70 to 30 percent. In addition, the Republic was to have an army of 2.000 members, 60 percent Greek Cypriot and 40 percent Turkish Cypriot. After an initial period, a 2.000 member security force consisting of police and gendarmerie was to be 70 percent greek Cypriot and 30 percent Turkish Cypriot.⁶

⁶ The 1960 Constitution of The Cyprus Republic.

As we can see; the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots, for which they had fought, were not realised. Cyprus would not be united with Greece as most of them had hoped. Makarios, accepting independence as the pragmatic course, returned to Cyprus on March 1, 1959. And he was elected president. The first general election for the House of Representatives took place on July 31, 1960. And the Constitution became effective August 16, 1960 on the day Cyprus formally shed its colonial status and became a republic.

Independence did not ensure peace. Serious problems concerning the working and interpretation of the constitutional system appeared immediately. These problems reflected the sharp bicomunal division in the constitution and the historical and continuing distrust between the two communities. One major point of contention concerned the composition of units under the six-to-four ratio decreed for the Cypriot army. On October 20, 1961, Vice President Kucuk used his constitutional veto power as vice president to halt the development of an integrated force.

It soon became clear that Archbishop Makarios had never intended to promote and support the bi-national state. He looked upon it as a Greek state and ignored virtually all Turkish rights enshrined in the constitution. In a speech in 1962; Makarios said: "Until this Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled; the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated."

Article 173 of the Constitution provided that separate municipalities be established for Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots refused to obey this mandatory provision and in order to encourage them to do so the Turkish Cypriots said they would not vote for the Government's taxation proposals. The Greek Cypriots remained intransigent, so the Turkish Cypriots took the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus. In 1963 the Court did rule against the Greek Cypriots and they ignored it. The President of the Court resigned and the rule of law in Cyprus collapsed.

Another issue that provoked strong Greek Cypriot criticism was the right of the veto held by the Turkish Cypriot vice president and what amounted to final veto power held by the Turkish Cypriot representatives in the House of Representatives with respect to laws and decisions affecting the entire population.

V. The Akritas Plan and The 13 Points of Makarios: Some Greek Cypriots believed the constitutional impasse could be ended through bold action. Accordingly, a plan of action (the Akritas Plan) was drawn up sometime in 1963 by the Greek Cypriot minister of the interior, a close associate of Archbishop Makarios.

Akritas Plan is a plan of a conspiracy to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus, in pre-determined stages and methods, and to bring about the union of Cyprus with Greece. It provides for the creation of an underground army which would suppress any resistance by the Turks most forcefully, and in the shortest possible time, and make the Greek Cypriots masters of the situation "within a day or two, before outside intervention would be possible, probable, or justifiable".

This top secret document was first published by a local Greek newspaper (Patris) on 21 April, 1966. In a series of articles published subsequently by the same paper, it was disclosed that Makarios had assumed the responsibility for the implementation of the Plan, and that he had appointed Mr, Yorgadjis, who was the minister of the Interior at the time, to be “the Chief, Akritas”. (See Appendix A)

The plan’s course of action began with persuading the international community that concessions made to the Turkish Cypriots were too extensive and that the constitution had to be reformed if the island were to have a functioning government. Another of the plan’s goals was the revocation of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. If these aims were realised, ENOSIS would become possible. If Turkish Cypriots refused to accept these changes and attempted to block them by force, the plan foresaw their violent subjugation “in a day or two” before foreign powers could intervene.

On 30 November 1963, Makarios confronted the Turkish wing of the Cyprus government with a proposal for thirteen amendments. Makarios declared that certain constitutional provisions “threatened to paralyze the State machinery.” He said that the revisions were necessary to remove obstacles that prevented Greek and Turkish Cypriots from “cooperating in the spirit of understanding and friendship.” While proposing these amendments he also mentioned that “if these proposals would not be accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, then they will be applied one-sided by the Greek Cypriots.”⁷

The thirteen points involved constitutional provisions, including the abandonment of the veto power by both the president and the vice president, an idea that certainly would have been rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, who thought of the veto as a form of life insurance for the minority community. The proposed amendments would have eliminated most of the special rights of Turkish Cypriots. For instance, they would have abolished many of the provisions for separate communal institutions, substituting an integrated state with limited guarantees for the minority community. The administration of justice was to be unified. Instead of the separate municipalities that the constitution had originally called for in the five largest towns, municipalities were to be unified. (See Appendix B)

Turkish Cypriot Vice President Kucuk reportedly had agreed to consider these proposals. Turkish Cypriots rejected the proposal and declared that the proposal was an attempt to undermine the constitution.

VI. Intercommunal Violence: At Christmas 1963 the Greek Cypriot militia attacked Turkish Cypriot communities across the island, and very many men, women, and children were killed. Thereafter Turkish Cypriot MPs, judges, and other officials were prevented by force from carrying out their duties.

Destruction of Turkish villages forced many Turkish Cypriots to withdraw into defensible enclaves. A substantial portion of the island’s Turkish Cypriot population

⁷ Guvenc, Nazim. The Problem of Cyprus. Modern Politics Publishments, 1984, Istanbul p. 87

was crowded into the Turkish quarter of Nicosia in tents and hastily constructed shacks. Slum conditions resulted from the serious overcrowding. All necessities as well as utilities had to be brought in through the Greek Cypriot lines.

The effect of the crisis of December 1963 was to deliver control of the formal organs of Government into the hand of the Greek Cypriots alone.

The 1960 Constitution had, by Article 182, expressly provided that its basic Articles could not in any way be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. Any fundamental change to the Constitution would require agreement with the Turkish Cypriots and the consent of the Guarantor powers, but this was never sought.

On 28th December 1963 the Daily Express carried the following report from the Cyprus: “ We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that people seemed stunned beyond tears.”⁸

British troops in Cyprus at the time did what they could to protect the Turkish Cypriots, but the scale and ferocity of the Greek Cypriot attacks made their task impossible.

Makarios’s central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots. The fact is neither the US, the UK, the UN, nor anyone, other than Turkey 11 years later, ever took effective action to prevent it.

Turkish Cypriots had become refugees in their own land. Expenditure of the Turkish Communal Chamber had dropped considerably. Furthermore, a large part of its remaining resources had to be used for unemployment relief and other forms of compensation as approximately half the entire Turkish Cypriot population came to be on relief.

Makarios was jubilant in announcing that Cyprus was now Greece and the House of Representatives, now composed of 100 % Greek Cypriots, had already passed a resolution on ENOSIS, stating that nothing else could be the “national aim.”

A conference among the guarantor powers was held in London in 1964. No positive result emerged from it because the Greek side insisted on a revision of the constitution and the Agreements in a way that would left the Turkish community entirely at the mercy of the Greeks and leave the door wide open to ENOSIS.

After the failure of the London Conference, the situation in the island further deteriorated with continuous Greek attacks on Turks throughout the island. UK brought the issue before the UN Security Council in February 1964. On 4 March 1964, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution which provided for the dispatch of a Peace-Keeping Force to Cyprus “to use its best effort to prevent a recurrence of

⁸ Stephen, Michael. The Cyprus Question. London, April 1997 p.14

fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”

The arrival of UNFICYP did not prevent the Greek Cypriot armed elements under the control of Makarios from attacking and oppressing Turkish Cypriots throughout the island. While Turkish Cypriots looked to the Security Council and UNFICYP for security and justice, the Greek Cypriot leaders maintained that peace and normality could only be achieved if the UN Force helped Greek armed elements to deal with the Turkish Cypriot “rebels.”

In June 1964, the House of Representatives, functioning with only its Greek Cypriot members, passed a bill establishing the National Guard, which all Cypriot males between the ages of 18 and 59 were liable to compulsory service. Invited by Makarios, Grivas returned to Cyprus in June to assume command of the National Guard; the purpose of the new law was to curb the proliferation of Greek Cypriot irregular bands and bring them under control in an organisation commanded by Grivas. By midsummer the National Guard consisted of an estimated 24,000 officers and men, about half from the Greek Army. In August 1964, the National Guard carried out a coordinated sea and land assault on Turkish Cypriots in an effort to cut off the major Turkish Cypriot supply line to the mainland. The struggle continued.

In mid-November 1967 Grivas and National Guard launched an attack on the Turkish village of Kophinou. Within a few hours 28 Turks were murdered and scores wounded. The Kophinou attack was planned to demonstrate the fiery spirit of the ENOSIS struggle and to prove to Turkish Cypriots that Turkey could do nothing about it. Turkey issued an ultimatum which included some conditions like the expulsion of Grivas from Cyprus, removal of Greek troops from Cyprus, payment of indemnity for the casualties at Kophinou, cessation of pressure on the Turkish Cypriot community, and the disbanding of the National Guard.

Grivas resigned as commander of the Greek Cypriot forces on November 20, 1967, and left the island. Also, 10,000 Greek troops were withdrawn. Makarios did not disband the National Guard.

In late December 1967 Turkish Cypriot leaders announced the establishment of a “transitional administration” to govern their community’s affairs until such time as the provisions of the Constitution of 1960 have been fully implemented. The provisional government did not state that the Communal chamber was being abolished. Nor did it seek recognition as a government. Such actions would have been contrary to the provisions of the constitution and the Zurich-London agreements, and the Turkish Cypriots scurpulously avoided any such abrogation.

Makarios failed in his efforts to limit the autonomy of the National Guard which remained attached to ENOSIS. Between 1969 and 1971, several groups embarked on a renewed terrorist campaign for ENOSIS. Grivas returned clandestinely to Cyprus in 1971 and set up a new guerilla organisation, the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters. (EOKA-B) Most members of the terrorist movement held regular jobs in the Greek Cypriot community; half were police officials and members of the National Guard.

There was also considerable evidence of support of EOKA B activities by the Greek junta. The conflict between Makarios and the Greek junta increased. With the death of Grivas from a heart attack in 1974, EOKA B came more directly under the control of the military junta in Athens which was even more hostile to Makarios.

VII. 1974 Greek Coup D'etat and the Turkish Intervention: A coup d'etat in Athens in November 1973 had made an anticommunist Ioannides the leader of junta. His experiences convinced him that Makarios should be removed from office because of domestic leftist support and his visits to communist capitals. During the spring of 1974, Cypriot intelligence found evidence that EOKA B was planning a coup and was being supplied, controlled, and funded by the military government in Athens. Early in July, Makarios wrote to the president of Greece demanding that the remaining 650 Greek officers assigned to the National Guard be withdrawn. Makarios sent his letter to the Greek president on July 2, 1974; the reply came thirteen days later, not in the form of a letter but in an order from Athens to the Cypriot National Guard to overthrow its commander in chief and take control of the island. (15 July 1974)

The lightly armed pro-Makarios units were no match for the heavily armed National Guardsmen and the EOKA B irregulars. Former EOKA gunman and convicted murderer Nicos Sampson was proclaimed president. The Greek troops, under the leadership of Sampson, immediately began to murder both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey, as one of the guarantors of the Cyprus Republic, could not accept the Greek fait accompli against the independence and sovereignty of the republic, nor could it stand by and watch Turkish Cypriots being killed or put under the Greek colonial yoke. The Prime Minister of Turkey, Bulent Ecevit, flew to London on 17 July 1974 to try to convince the British government that, as the two guarantors, they should jointly intervene to prevent a complete take over of Cyprus by Greece. But the British were either unwilling or unprepared and declined to take action as a guarantor power. Turkey demanded removal of Nicos Sampson and the Greek officers from the National Guard and a binding guarantee of Cypriot independence. But, Greek junta rejected these demands.

It became incumbent on Turkey to undertake a unilateral action under the Treaty of Guarantee to put an end to the ongoing violent situation in Cyprus and to save the Turkish Cypriot Community as well as the Greek Cypriots who opposed the Greek junta.

On July 20, 1974, Turkey sent troops to Cyprus. Ecevit issued a statement announcing that the Turkish armed forces were engaged in a peace operation in Cyprus to end decades of strife provoked by extremist and irredentist elements. He said that Turkey's action was not an invasion but an act against invasion.

The peaceful approach of the Turkish armed forces was met with violence and Greek Cypriot armed elements under the commanders and supporters from "mainland Greece" armed forces in Cyprus, started to attack landing Turkish troops on the island. At the same time they launched an all out armed attack on all Turkish Cypriot Communities all over the island, in a frenzy of ethnic cleansing.

On July 23, 1974, the Greek junta collapsed in Athens, Sampson resigned in Nicosia. Karamanlis became the prime minister of Greece and Clerides became the president of Cyprus.

On July 25, 1974, an international conference was held at Geneva between Turkey, Greece, and Britain. It was agreed that Greek and Greek Cypriot forces would leave all the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, but they proceeded instead to murder almost the entire civilian population of six Turkish Cypriot enclaves in both the north and south of the island, and despite the presence of UN troops in Cyprus.

More massacres of Turkish Cypriots happened. On 23rd July 1974 the Washington Post reported: "In a Greek raid on a small Turkish village near Limasol 36 people were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived."⁹

The Greek newspaper Eleftherotipia published an interview with Nicos Sampson on 26th February 1981 in which he is reported as saying "Had Turkey not intervened I would not only have proclaimed ENOSIS but I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus."¹⁰

A second conference in Geneva began on August 10, 1974, with Clerides and Denktas as the Cypriot representatives. During the conference; the Turkish enclaves were still under Greek occupation, thousands of Turkish Cypriots were still being held as hostages, and armed Greek elements were still harassing Turkish Cypriots. When the Turkish Foreign Minister tabled a conciliatory proposal for "cantonal federation" as a basis for solution, the Greek Cypriot representative rejected it and demanded a 36 hour recess for further consultations in Nicosia. It was obvious that the Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives were trying to gain time in order to regroup their forces in the island and to muster enough international support to leaver the Turkish peace force out of Cyprus. The time factor was vitally important and therefore Turkey insisted on an agreement at least in principle. News of genocide in the Messaoria electrified the whole situation and so, on August 14, 1974, the second Turkish operation began. After a three-day action, freeing Turkish areas and preventing massacres, the Turkish forces stopped their operation on August 16, 1974.

⁹ Stephen, Michael, The Cyprus Question. London, April 1997 p. 25

¹⁰ Stephen, Michael. The Cyprus Question. London, April 1997 p. 27.

CONCLUSION

After all these facts, it is obvious that the ENOSIS aim of Greeks and the Greek Cypriots, under the leadership and support of Makarios was the most important factor for the violence and the massacres on the island. As we see; 13 Points of Makarios and the Akritas Plan are designed for a possible ENOSIS and the rejection of the Turks from the island.

As a Greek reporter, Stavros Angelides reports on Greek daily Fileeleftheros we can ask: “Was it Turkey who tried to abolish the Cyprus constitution? Did the Turks bring Grivas to island to achieve ENOSIS by the force of arms in 1967 and to establish the criminal organisation EOKA-B in 1971? Was it Turkey who staged the coup against Makarios?” (Fileeleftheros, 18.3.1990)

The answer is “no”. But, we can say that it was Turkey who tried to prevent ENOSIS and the massacres of all Cypriots within the island with an intervention. But, still, it was and it is Greece and the supporters of ENOSIS who reject the peace on the island.

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APPENDIX A

THE AKRITAS PLAN (Some Important Paragraphs Which Show The Greek Violence Plans)

The Cyprus problem had been presented to world public opinion and to diplomatic circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination.

- a. Consequently our first aim has been to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not been solved and that it has to be reviewed.
- b. The creation of the following impressions has been accepted as the primary objective:
 1. That the solution which has been found is not satisfactory.
 2. That the agreement which has been reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties.
 3. That the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and,
 4. That the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitute the strong element on which foreigners must rely.
- c. Many diplomatic missions have already come to believe strongly that the Agreements are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a result of pressures and intimidations without real negotiations. Generally speaking, it has been shown that so far the administration of Cyprus has been carried out by Greeks and that the Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.
- d. It is obvious that today the international opinion is against any form of oppression, and especially against oppression of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on ENOSIS but on self-determination.

When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite.

Actions to be taken are as follows:

- a. The amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and the consequent de facto nullification of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance.

- b. Once this is achieved the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.
- c. After the removal of these restrictions; the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, express and apply its will.

The only danger is the possibility of a forceful external intervention. Intervention cannot take place before negotiations take place between the Guarantor Powers. At this stage, we shall need international support.

It is evident that for intervention to be justified there must be a more serious reason and a more immediate danger than simple constitutional amendments. Such reasons can be:

- a. The declaration of ENOSIS before the abolishment of Treaties.
- b. Serious intercommunal unrest which may be shown as a massacre of Turks.

Our actions for amending the Constitution will not be secret; we would always appear to be ready for peaceful talks.

- a. In a case of spontaneous resistance by the Turks, if our counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a panic created among Greeks. We will then be in danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks.
- b. In case of a planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time.
- c. The forceful and decisive suppressing of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences for their Community.
- d. In case of the clashes becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through the actions, the immediate declaration of ENOSIS, because, then, there will be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic activity.

We must enlighten our members about our plans and objectives only verbally. There can be no action that would inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents of the present document or the publication of this by the opposition.

Every effort must be made to show ourselves as moderates.

The Chief
AKRITAS

APPENDIX B

MAKARIOS' 13 POINTS

1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned.
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. Unified Municipalities to be established.
7. The administration of Justice to be unified.
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a Law.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
11. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.
13. The Communal Chambers to be abolished.